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LAS NAVAS DE TOLOSA 
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University ofBirminghan 
RESUMEN 
El autor analiza en este artículo el influjo del Papa Inocencio III en la conse-
cución de la visctoria cristiana en la batalla de Las Navas de Tolosa y la proyec-
ción que tomó en España en las ideas de batalla y reconquista. Los elementos 
esenciales fueron: reforma de la Iglesia, el estableciemiento de la Paz y la pro-
pagación del cristianismo. 
ABSTRACT 
Then study here exposed tries to understand the pope of Innocent III in the 
battle of Las Navas de Tolosa and it influence in Spain through the notins of 
crusade and Reconquista. The esential elements were: the reform of the Church, 
the establishmnet of peace and the spiritual propagation of Christendom. 
1. RODRIGO JIMÉNEZ DE RADA AND INNOCENT III 
Though one might expect that education in the theology and philosophy of 
the Paris schools and in the Canon Law of Bologna might have bound them 
together, as a shared intellectual inheritance bound many others to the Pope, 
the archbishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada (1208-1247), exceptional 
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author, politician, propagator of the Reconquista and of Toledan primacy, did 
not recall Innocent III (1198-1216) with any measurable degree of affection^ 
In Rodrigo's most celebrated and influential work. De Rebus Hispanie, the 
draft of which was completed in 1243^, twenty-seven years after the death of 
Innocent, Rodrigo directly mentioned Innocent on four occasions and concer-
ning three subjects; subjects that were close to the Archbishop's heart — the 
primacy, money, and the Reconquista — and certainly on three of these occa-
sions. Innocent is connected with events which held unhappy memories for 
Rodrigo: 
1) Book VI, chapter 4: Rodrigo recalls that Innocent had crowned King 
Peter II of Aragon at the monastery of San Pancrazio. This puzzling event of 
10 November 1204 held gloomy implications for Rodrigo's cherished Toledan 
primacy (the primatial rights Toledo claimed over the Braga, Compostela, 
Narbonne and Tarragona metropolitans) since, on 16 June 1205, Innocent or-
dered all subsequent Aragonese coronations to be performed by the archbishop 
of Tarragona (implicitly an equal to Rodrigo as metropolitan and at Zaragoza 
(a potential rival capital to Toledo)^. 
1 1. On Pope Innocent Ill's education, M. MACCARRONE, «Innocenzo HI prima del pontifica-
to»: ASRSP 66 (1943) 70-81., J. C. MoORE. «Lotario dei Conti di Segni (Pope Innocent III) in the 
1180s»: AHP 29 (1991) 255-8; K. PENNINGTON, «The Legal Education of Pope Innocent III»: Bulle-
tin of the Institute of Medieval Canon Law 4 (1974) 70-7; IDEM, «Further thoughts on Pope Innocent 
m's knowledge of law»: Zeitschrift fiir Rechtsgeschichte 113 (1986) 417-28; W. IMKAMP, Das Kir-
chenbild Innocenz'III (1198-1216), Stuttgart 1983, 20-45. On Rodrigo's education, M. BALLESTEROS 
GAIBROIS, Don Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Barcelona 1936, 34-5, 44; H. GRASSOTTI, «Don Rodrigo 
Ximénez de Rada, gran señor y hombre de negocios en la Castilla del siglo XIII: Cuadernos de Histo-
ria de España 55-6 (1972) 4; A. CASTRO, La Realidad Histórica de España, México 1954, 209-10. 
Rodrigo was still in Paris in April 1201 when he made his will promising to be buried at the monas-
tery of Huerta (Cartulario del monasterio de Santa María de Huerta, éd. J. A. GARCIA LUJÁN, Mo-
nasterio de Santa María de Huerta 1981, no. 71, p. 113). On the educational friendship network of 
Innocent III. J.W. BALDWIN, Masters, Princes and Merchants., the Social Views of Peter the Chanter 
and his Circle, 2 vols, Princeton 1970; T. NIELSEN, «Vicarius Christi, Plenitudo potestatis og causae 
maiores: Teologi og Jura hos Pave Innocens.III (1198-1216) og Aerkebiskop Anders Sunesen (1201-
1223)»: Historisk Tidsskrift 94 (1994)1-29. 
2 RODRIGO XIMÉNEZ DE RADA, Historia de rebvs Hispanic sive Historia Gothica, ed. J. 
FERNÁNDEZ VALVERDE, CCCM 72 (1987)[hereafter DRH] xvi-xix. On the dates of composition, B. 
F. REILLY, «Sources of the Fourth Book of Lucas of Tuy's Chronicon Mundi»: Classical Folia 30 
(1976) 131-2; P. LiNEHAN, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain, Oxford 1993, 350-1. On the 
value of Rodrigo as a historian, D. LOMAX, «Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada como historiador»: Actas del 
Quinto Congreso Internacional de Hispanistas, Bordeaux 1977, 589. 
3 DRH, Bk. VI, c. 4, p. 181; La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III (965-1216), ed. D. 
MANSILLA, Rome 1955 [hereafter MDHI], no. 307, pp. 339-41, no. 314, pp. 346-7; Regesta pontifi-
cum Romanorum inde ab anno 1198 ad annum 1304, ed. A. POTTHAST, 2 vols, Graz 1957 [volume 1, 
hereafter Potthast], 2322, 2361, 2543; Patrologiae latinae cursus completos, ed. J.-P. MiGNE, 221 
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2) Book VII, chapter 24: Rodrigo fumes because the Pope's intransigent 
insistence on the sacramentaUty of marriage had broken the incestuous marria-
ge of Alfonso IX of León (1188-1230) and the infanta Berenguela, daughter of 
Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158-1214) and therefore, from Rodrigo's viewpoint. 
Innocent had scuppered the chances of peace between León and Castile and 
thus Innocent had halted the process of the Reconquista^. 
3) Book IX, chapter 2: Rodrigo merely mentions that Innocent had prohibi-
ted the marriage of King Henry I of Castile (1214-1217) to the infanta Mafalda 
of Portugal. Innocent's letter of 1216 escapes direct censure and while Rodrigo 
might expect us to recall the result of Innocent's previous marital interference, 
the abandonment of this projected incestuous union, did not assume the same 
political importance, both because the situation against the Moors was no lon-
ger parlous and Henry's life was soon to be over^. 
4) Book IX, chapter 9: Rodrigo recollects that Master Gonzalo García, the 
papal tax-collector in the Iberian Peninsula between 1213 and 1222, had been 
of the household of Innocent III. Gonzalo it was who had uncovered Rodrigo's 
misappropriation of the revenue raised from the crusading tax and hence ear-
ned the Archbishop the censure of Honorius III in 1220 and a demand for full 
payment of the same^. 
Innocent III had plenty of detractors. From Walter von der Vogelweide's 
mild 'Oh, the Pope is too young. God, help your Christendom' to Giovanni 
Capocci's reported accusation 'Your words are God's words, but your works 
vols, Paris 1844-64 [hereafter MPLI, 215, cols. 550, 665; B. PALACIOS MARTIN, La coronación de 
los reyes de Aragón 1204-1410: Aportación al estudio de las estructuras medievales, Valencia 1975, 
102-5; LlNEHAN, History and the Historians, 389-90; D. SMITH, Innocent III and Aragon-Catalonia: 
Studies on Papal Power, University of Birmingham PH.D Thesis 1997, 36-94. 
4 DRH, Bk. VII, c. 24, p. 247: MDHI. no. 138. pp. 168-70, no. 196, pp. 209-15, no. 276, pp. 
305-6, no. 299, p. 332, no. 305, pp. 336-9, no. 331, p. 358; J. GONZÁLEZ, El reino de Castilla en la 
época de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols, Madrid 1960, 1, 723-5; IDEM, Alfonso IX, 2 vols, Madrid 1944, 1, 95-
120; LlNEHAN, History and the Historians, 256-9; D. MANSILLA, «Inocencio III y los reinos hispa-
nos»: Anthologica Annua 2 (1954) 20-31; J. F. RIVERA RECIO, La Iglesia de Toledo en el siglo XII, 
Rome 1966, 237-41; R. FLETCHER, The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century, 
Oxford 1978, 210-1. 
5 DRH, BK. IX, c. 2, p. 283; MDHI, nos. 558, 564, pp. 582-3; La documentación pontificia de 
Honorio III (1216-1227), éd. D. MANSILLA, Rome 1965 [hereafter MDHI, no. 103, p. 84; GONZÁLEZ, 
Alfonso VIII, 1, 753; IDEM, Alfonso DC, 1. 163-4. 
6 DRH, Bk. IX, c. 9, p. 290; Bularlo portugués. Inocencio III (1198-1216), éd. A. DE JESUS DE 
COSTA and M. A. FERNANDES MARQUES, Coimbra 1989, no. 199; MDH, no. 188, pp. 148-9; P. 
LlNEHAN, The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century, Cambridge 1971, 18-9; P. 
FREEDMAN, «TWO letters of Pope Honorius III on the collection of ecclesiastical revenues in Spain»: 
Romische Historische Mittellungen 32-3 (1990-1) 37-40. 
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are the devil's works' examples are easily recalled^. Rodrigo's detraction, 
however, is of special significance and of a special kind. Why 'of special sig-
nificance'? Because Rodrigo's De Rebus Hispanie has probably done more to 
shape how other historiaras, medieval and modem, view his homeland than 
any other single work. Why 'of a special kind'? Because Rodrigo is a first-rate 
manipulator of history and he knows omittance is the best way to detract from 
a person or event. Therefore, Rodrigo omitted from his history referente to the 
proceedings of the Fourth Lateran Council (November, 1215), where, we 
know, he had unsuccessfully tried to raise his primacy above an honorific dig-
nity by accusing the see of Braga of being a nest of antipopes (referring to 
Maurice Burdinus) and implying that Santiago at Compostela was nothing but 
a tall-tale^. In the most famous book of De Rebus Hispanie, Book Eight, Ro-
drigo's deservedly oft-cited eye-witness account of the campaign of Las Navas 
de Tolosa (June-July 1212), a narrativo that was generally accepted by later 
Hispanic chroniclers. Innocent III receives no mention^. Rodrigo remembered 
7 Selected Poems of Walther von der Vogelweide, ed. M. FITZGERALD RiCHEY, Oxford 1965, 
21. Capocci's outburst can be found in Caesanus Heisterbacensis Monachi ordinis Cisterciensis 
Dialogus Miraculorum, ed. J. STRANGE, 2 vols, Cologne 1851, 1, 103. For other examples, M.-T. 
ALVERNY, «NOVUS regnat Salomon in diebus malis: Une satire contre Innocent HI»: P. G. SCHMIDT 
(Ed.), Festschríft Bemhard Bischoff, Stuttgart 1971, 382-90: RALPH OF COGGESHALL, Chronicon 
Anglicanum, ed. J. STEVENSON, Rolls Seríes 66 (1875) 130- 3; S. KUTTNER, «Universal Pope or 
Servant of God's Servants: The Canonists, Papal Titles, and Innocent III»: Revue du droit canonique 
32(1981)129-31. 
8 Sacrorum concillorum nova et amplissima collectio, ed. G. MANSI, 31 vols, Florence 1759-98, 
22, 1071-5; A. GARCIA Y GARCIA, «El Concilio IV Lateranense (1215) y Francia»: AHC 26 (1994) 
61-86; J. RIVERA RECIO, «Personajes Hispanos Asistentes en 1215 al IV Concilio de Letran»: Híspa-
nla Sacra 4 (1951) 335-42; R. FOREVILLE, Latran I, II, III et Latran W, Paris 1965, 263-5; IDEM, 
«L'Iconographie du XIIE Concile Oecuménique: Letran IV (1215)»: Mélanges offerts à René Crozet, 
Poitiers 1966, 1124-7; LINEHAN, History and the Historians, 328-31. 
9 DRH, BK.VIII, chs 1-13, pp. 259-78, provides the almost verbatim text for the account of the 
Las Navas campaign of the most widely disseminated later Medieval Hispanic chronicle: Primera 
Crónica General de España, ed. R. MENÉNDEZ PIDAL, Madrid 1955, 684-705 (though A. CASTRO, 
The Spaniards: an Introduction to their History, California 1971, 15-6 notes the increased nationalis-
tic emphasis of the latter) - DRH (or, at least, its author) also inf orms LUCAS OF TUY, Crónica de 
España, ed. J. Puyol, Madrid 1926, 412-15; G. CIROT (ed. ), «Une chronique latine inédite des rois 
de Castille (1236)»: Bulletin Hispanique 14 (1912), 271-4, 353-66; Los Anales Toledanos ly II, ed. J. 
P. MARTIN'-CLETO, Toledo 1993, 172-3; BERNAT DESCLOT, Crónica, ed. M. COLL I ALLENTORN, 
Barcelona 1982, 53-7. Desclot magnifies the part played in the battle by the Catalan ruler. King Peter 
II of Aragon (A. GODDARD ELLIOTT, «The Historian as Artist: Manipulation of History in the Chro-
nicle of Desclot»: Viator 14 (1983), 202) and Rodrigo's account was itself further manipulated for the 
sake of non CastiHan rulers. See, Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium, ed. L. BARRAU DIHIGO and J. 
MASSO TORRENTS, Barcelona 1925, 52-3; The Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña, ed. and trans. 
L.H.NELSON, Pennsylvania 1991, 58-9; CARLOS, PRINCIPE DE VlANA, Crónica de los Reyes de Navarra, 
ed. J. YANGUAS Y MIRANDA, Pamplona 1971, 115. Eventually many towns and nobles added their 
military prowess to the account of the battle drawing from J. F. POWERS the observation: 'Had all the 
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Innocent without affection and determined that the Papacy's best efforts would 
be altogether forgotten. 
2. THE SIGNIHCANCE OF LAS NAVAS TO SPAIN 
Las Navas was to be a very Spanish affair. 'SoU Hispani cum paucis ultra-
montanis' fought at Las Navas, Rodrigo famously declared, echoing the phrase 
'Soli Yspani virtute sua obtinuerint imperium' used by the eminent canonist 
Vincentius Hispanus at about the time of the battle, when reflecting on what a 
poor show the Germans had made of empire^o. To be precise there were three-
victors at Las Navas - God, the Catholic Faith and Spain. For the influential 
Bishop Lucas of Tuy, in his much-thumbed Chronicon MundU 'pugnant His-
pani reges pro fide''^; Alfonso VIII later assigned his successinon 'meis men-
tis sed Dei misericordia et meorum auxilio vassallorum'^^; For Rodrigo, at Las 
Navas Alfonso VIII fought 'pro fi de Christi mori desiderans'^^ and even San-
cho VI I of Navarre (1194-1234) turned up, bound 'in fidei catholice'^^ j ^ e 
matter was perhaps best summed up by Bishop Juan of Osma in the Chronique 
latine des rois de Castile: 'Mirabilis Deus in Sanctis suis qui tan mirabiliter 
providit Yspanie et precipue regno Castelle ut recedentibus ultramontanis glo-
ria victorie belli famosi Yspanis non ultramontanis tribueretur'^^. 
Though Rodrigo and his contemporaries recognized the importance of the 
attempt to internationalize the campaign and were fully conscious of their role 
in defending Christianitas, the participation of Rome was perceived as at best 
negligible, her success amounting to securing by Indulgences the ephemeral 
support of the treacherous Franci who had fled before the battle'^. As percepti-
municipal claimants produced their alleged forces along with the myriad aristocratic ancestors who 
allegedly participated in the battle, the support column might well have extended back to Santander'(J. F. 
POWERS, A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 
1000-1284, California 1988, 53); A. HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas de la Reconquista durante 
las Invasiones Africanas, Madrid 1956, 255-7, provides üsts of actual and alleged participants. 
10 DRH, BK.Vni, c. 6, p. 266; G. POST, «'Blessed Lady Spain' Vincentius ffispanus and Spanish 
National Imperialism in the Thirteenth Century»: Speculum 29 (1954) 206. 
11 LUCAS OF TUY, Crónica de España, 413. 
12 F. FITA, «Testamento del Rey D. Alfonso VII (8 Diciembre 1204)»: Boletín de la Real Aca-
demia de la Historia 8 (1886) 241. 
13 DRH, BK.VII, c. 34, p. 256. 
i4MZ)/í/, no.483,p. 510. 
15 G. ClROT (ed. ), «Chronique latine», 357-8; D. LOMAX, «The authorship of the Chronique la-
tine des rois de Castile»: Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 40 (1963) 205-11. 
16 LUCAS OF TUY, Crónica de España, 413; MDHI, no. 483, p. 510: Primera Crónica General, 
692; Los Anales Toledanos I y II, 172. 
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ons of the significance of the victory grew clearer it was the Franci who took 
the brunt of the abuse but while Vincentius Hispanus took the battle as indica-
tion that Frenchmen were all Talk^ ,^ Lucas of Tuy informed his audience at the 
outset that Hispania was better than Rome. After all, Hispania possessed the 
body and the mission of a proto-martyr, Santiago, and the mission of the 
Apostle Paul, whereas Rome only had the body of Saint PauP^, an argument 
that, no doubt, like most effective propaganda, relied more on expectations of 
repetition than its own inherent intellectual cogency. 
3. THE LAS NAVAS OF HISTORY 
Of course, the story of the battle itself, suffered from retelling. The victo-
rious chroniclers had, as victors are wont to do, exaggerated the force of their 
enemy, depicted the Christiaii situation as desperate, and had been somewhat 
prodigal with the truth as regards the heroism of their men and the splendour 
of their triumph. The studies of Huici Miranda and Eslava Galán on the Mus-
lim chroniclers ^ 9, which they shrewdly use in conjunction with their Christian 
counterparts, certainly reveal a fuller and rather different story of the conflict: 
the war was possibly provoked by Barcelona and Castile, accurately judging 
the weaknesses of their Almohad enemy^o. Al-Násir's chief advisor in North 
Africa, the highly capable Abd-al-Wahid, had warned him not to attempt the 
venture^^ Al-Nasir's army suffered from an extreme deficiency in organizá-
is LINEMAN, History and the Historians, 296-7; IDEM, «Religion, nationalism and national 
identity in medieval Spain and Portugal»: Studies in Church History, 18 (1982) 192; R, BARKAI, 
Cristianos y Musulmanes en la España Medieval, Madrid 1984, 217-19: M. DEFOURNEAUX, Les 
Franpais en Espagne auxXIe etXIIe Siècles, Paris 1949, 182-93. 
1^  LUCAS O F TUY, Crónica de España, 1-3; BARKAI, Cristianos y Musulmanes, 213-4; LI-
NEMAN, History and the Historians, 357'-'8. 
19 A. HuiCl MIRANDA, Estudios sobre la campaña de Las Navas de Tolosa, Valencia 1916; 
IDEM, Las Grandes Batallas de la Reconquista (cit.n.9), 307-12: J. ESLAVA GALÁN, «Tácticas en la 
batalla de las Navas de Tolosa»: Cuadernos de estudios medievales 6-7 (1978-9)3953. 
20 xi ie Bav¿5n Almohade (Colección de Crónicas árabes de la Reconquista, ed. A. HUICI 
M I R A N D A , 4 vols, Tetuán 1953, 2, 258) suggests the Mus l im invasion followed Peter IF s attack on 
the k ingdom of Valencia (though that attack resulted from Musl im raids on the Catalan coast); 
G O N Z A L E Z , Alfonso VIII (cit. n. 4 ) 1 , 981-2 shows that Alfonso was already preparing for war by 
repopulat ion and refortification of the frontier region from 1209; on this also, ESLAVA G A L Á N , «Tác-
ticas en la batalla», 4 5 ; HUICI M I R A N D A , Las Grandes Batallas, 227-8; IDEM, Historia Política del 
Imperio Almohade, 2 vols, Tetuán 1956-7, 2, 414-6; M. GUAL C A M A R E N A , «Precedentes de la Re-
conquista valenciana»: Estudios Medievales I (1953) 208-12, 232-4. 
21 GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, 1, 983-4; HUICI MIRANDA, Historia Política del Imperio Almohade, 
2, 417; IDEM, Las Grandes Batallas, 231, ESLAVA GALÁN, «Tácticas en la batalla», 45; R. LE 
TOURNEAU, The Almohad Movement, Princeton 1969, 82. 
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tion - in 1211 the Christian fortress of Salvatierra (the CastiUan Thermopylae) 
with a tiny garrison resisted a siege from the supposed might of the Almohad 
army for almost two months^^ i^ all, the Almohad army was on campaign for 
seventeen months, had its pay suspended, provisions denied and inevitably 
faced the pains of excepcional hunger and heat^ .^ To capital, Al-Násir, who 
was always a weak, pathetic and paranoid figure, a stammering academic, as 
Abd al Wahid al-Marákugl, who knew him, depicted him, had the governors of 
Fez and Ceuta decapitated on suspicion of mala dministration (for which act 
Le Toumeau accused him of 'unreasonable irritability') and executed his cap-
tain, the Andalusian Ibn Qadis, the defender of Calatrava, for surrender what 
was a hopeless position^" .^ Needless to say that this was not good for morale, 
particularly not in an army where Berbers and Andalusian Muslims found 
unity an impossibility and co-existence a trial, and this is all to say that the 
Almohads had already contributed a great deal to their defeat before their con-
servative tactics further dented their chances on the battlefield^^. 
Victory, of course, did not seem inevitable to Castillan Christians who li-
ved in the shadow of the catastrophic defeat of Alarcos in 1195^ :^ 'Ab eis non 
minus quam mortem expectamus' wrote Alfonso VIII to Philip Augustus in 
1212, encouragingly calculating the prospects of martyrdom on the cam-
paigns^. 'Archiepiscope, ego et vos hic moriamur' Alfonso famously revealed 
to Rodrigo on the battlefield^^; and when Berenguela received news of the 
22 A l - M u ' y i b fi ' taljis ajbár a l -magreb, ed. R. DoZY, Leiden 1881, 236; Colección de Crónicas 
Árabes (cit, n. 20) , 2, 2675 ; DRH, BK.VII , c. 35 , p . 256 ; G. ClROT (ed), «Chronique Latine»(cit , n. 9) , 
272; Los Anales Toledanos I y II, 172; HUICI MIRANDA, Historia Política del Imperio Almohade, 2, 
4 1 8 ; I D E M , Las Grandes Batallas, 236-8; J. GOÑI G A Z T A M B I D E , Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada 
en España. Vitoria 1958, 112.- GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, 1, 989-94. A. FOREY, «The Mili tary Orders 
and the Spanish Reconques t in the Twelfth and Thir teenth Centuries»- Traditio 40 (1984) 212-3 . 
23 Colección de Crónicas Árabes, 2, 262; ESLAVA GALÁN, «Tácticas en la batalla», 46 ; HUICI 
MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 232; IDEM, Historia Política del Imperio Almohade, 2, 417; L E 
TOURNEAU, The Almohad Movement, 83; C. SÁNCHEZ-ALBORNOZ, La España Musulmana, 2 vols, 
Buenos Aires 1960, 2, 285. 
24 Al-Mar¿Nkugl (cit. n. 22)226; Colección de Crónicas Árabes, 2, 269 ; ESLAVA GALÁN, «Tác-
ticas en la batalla», 45-6 ; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 232; IDEM, Historia Política del 
Imperio Almohade, 2, 417 , 433-5 ; L E T O U R N E A U , The Almohad Movement, 80, 8 3 ; SÁNCHEZ-
ALBORNOZ, La España Musulmana, 2, 2 8 3 ; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, I, 988 . 
25 ESLAVA GALÁN, «Tácticas en la batalla», 53; L E TOURNEAU, The Almohad Movement, 60, 
78, 85, 110; HUICI MIRANDA, Historia Política del Imperio Almohade, 2, 417. 
26 DRH, B K VI I, chs. 28-30, pp . 251-3 , c. 33 , p . 255 ; G. ClROT (éd.), «Chronique Latine» (cit, 
n. 9), 256-60; LUCAS OF TUY, Crónica de España (cit. n. 9) , 407 ; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, I, 911; 
I D E M , Alfonso DC (cit. n. 4) , 1, 9 2 - 3 ; GoÑi GAZTAMBIDE, Historia de la Bula (cit. n. 22), 96-7 ; HUICI 
MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 114219. 
27 GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, 3 , no . 890, pp. 557-8 . 
28 DRH, BK. VIII, c. 10, p . 272. 
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victory she refused to believe it until she had seen the letters from her father, 
so incredible did the whole thing seem^ .^ Yet at a more comfortable distance it 
cannot but appear that the Almohads were always struggling because not only 
did they have to fight on two fronts —when putting down rebellion in Africa 
facing Christian revolt in the north and viceversa— but on the Iberian frontier, 
they could not generally field sufficient forces to cope with more than half of 
the sector involved. The Empire was too vast to be effectively governed, far 
greater than the means then held to sustain it. The sheer increase in Christian 
population and resources compared with the inability of the Muslims even at 
the height of their power to resettle the frontier regions, the development of 
Christian political and economic institutions, a developing military technolo-
gy, in part brought about by the increasing ties with transpyrenean Europe, 
suggest that there is ample reason to concur with the troubadour view ex-
pressed after Alarcos (a victory which, it has been pointed out, brought no 
territorial gains): 'Before we lost the Holy Sepulchre, and now we might lose 
Spain; for the first there are obstacles, but for the second we need fear neither 
sea nor wind'^ 0^ 
4. ROSCHER'S VIEW OF LAS NAVAS 
Negligible participation in a commonplace victory, would not be well for a 
discussion on the papal contribution on the path to Las Navas. Yet worse is to 
follow since Helmut Roscher, who in his excellent Papst Innocenz' III und die 
Kreuzzüge is one of the few historiaras to deal specifically and seriously with 
the papal role in the Las Navas campaign, following the account of the Hispa-
nist Gams (who followed Rodrigo), went a step further than Rodrigo in su-
ggesting Innocent was not only ineffective in the campaign but a hindrance to 
29 Letter of Berenguela to Blanche, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, éd. M. 
BOUQUET and L. D E L I S L E , 25 vols, Paris 1738-1904, 19, 254. 
30 The lament is attributed to Foulques of Toulouse by M. MiLA Y FONTANALS, De los trovado-
res en España, Barcelona 1861, 118-121; on Foulques, P. C A B A U , «Foulque, marchand et troubadour 
de Marseille, moine et abbé du Thoronet , évêque de Toulouse (v. 1155/116025.12.1231)»: Cahiers de 
Fanjeaux 21 (1986) 151-79; B . BOLTON, «Fulk of Toulouse: the escape that failed»: Studies in 
Church History 12 (1975) 83-93; S. S T R O N S K I , Folquet de Marseille, Cracow 1910. On Alarcos as a 
defensiva victory, LE TOURNEAU, The Almohad movement, 75 , 101-3; HUICI, Historia Política del 
Imperio Almohade, 4 3 2 . 0 n Christian advance, C. BiSHKO, «The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 
1095-1492»: K. S E T T O N (Ed. ), A History of the Crusades, 6 vols, Madison 1969-89, 3, 397-^8, 400; 
POWERS, A Society Organized for War (cit. n. 9), 17; R. B A R T L E T T . The Making of Europe: Con-
quest, colonization and cultural change 950-1350, London 1994. 70 -1 . 
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it^^ Innocent's input was of negative value and Spain was not at the forefront 
of Innocent's desires. Excepting Celestine III (1191-1198) Innocent followed 
the traditions of the Twelfth Century Papacy and solely reacted to information 
that reached him from Spain. When Innocent sent his legate Rainier to Spain 
between 1198-1200, Rainier did not deal with the crusade against the Moor at 
all, but concentrated on the breaking of the ilhcit union between Alfonso IX of 
León and Berenguela. Innocent had put little effort into breaking any alliance 
between the King of León and the Moors or even securing Alfonso IX's neu-
trality. The initiative for the new crusade in 1210 came from Alfonso VIII and 
Prince Ferdinand of Castile; neither the plan of campaign nor the timing of it 
were Innocent's undertaking. Innocent did not help in the financing of the 
crusade. In Innocent's last letter to Alfonso VIII before the battle, his rousing 
cry read 'since all the world now lies in wickedness, we advise that if you can 
obtain a fair truce then you should take it, until the opportune time may come 
when you are able to beat the enemies of the Cross of Christ more easily'3^. 
Certainly, some element of what Roscher argued is true. Nobody would 
deny that the financial burden of the enterprise fell upon the kingdom of Al-
fonso VIII and most especially the Castillan church, and nobody would su-
ggest that the Pope in Rome could have much idea about tactics of warfare in 
the Peninsula and how to organize the diverse forces that participated. But it 
can be argued that Roscher emphasised the negative over the positive elements 
in the contribution of Innocent III and his predecessors in the Iberian crusades 
and extracted from their proper context expressions that can be better unders-
tood in terms of papal policy over a broader period; it is in the long-term ins-
titutional and ideological development of the Peninsula that the Papacy makes 
its contribution. Moreover, if we take it that Las Navas is an unsurprising 
triumph, then we can argue that the importance of Las Navas ultimately lies 
less in the battle itself than in the myth of Spanish unity attached to it. And to 
that myth, by giving to Spain, as MacKay suggested 'a semblance of peace and 
unity' at Las Navas^^, the Roman Curia over a broad period, and most espe-
cially Innocent III, had made a significant contribution to the Reconquista, 
31 H. ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz HI und die Kreuzzüge, Góttingen 1969, 184-7; P. GAMS, Die 
Kirchengeschichte von Spanien, 6 vols, Graz 1956, 3, 111-154; cf. GOÑI GAZTAMBIDE, Historia de la 
Bula, 114; Unfortunately, G. MARTINI, «Innocenzo III ed il finanziamento delle Crociate»: ASRSP 67 
(1944) 309-335, adopted a nonlatitudinarian approach to the Crusades: 'Per non parlare délia guerra di 
Spagna contro i Morj, le crociate predicate da Innocenzo IE furono tre: la quarta, la quinta, e, tra esse, 
la crociata contro gli Albigensi (p. 315). 
32 R O S C H E R , Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge, 184-7. 
33 A. M A C K A Y , Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000-1500, Macmil lan 
1977, 33-4. 
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5. THE RECONQUISTA 
What is the Reconquista? It is not an easy thing to define, because it means, 
as it meant, a great many different things to many people. It is a myth, the 
myth that between the Arab invasion of 711 and the conquest of Granada in 
1492, the Hispanic peoples constantly fought or intended to fight for a 
liberation of the Peninsula from the Moors, and a return to an ancient 'Híspa-
nla' under a purif led Gothic dynasty. And most often to this myth a belief in a 
prelapsarian state is added. 'Hispania' was lost through sin, through the bad 
life of Christians; the Reconquista is an expiation (in the recurring phrase) 'pro 
peccatis nostris' and only through the assistance of God would the Church, 
people and kingdom be restored and Islam defeated. Both the Gothic and the 
religious elements of this myth had certainly existed from the end of the Ninth 
Century, if not before^ "^ . 
But it is difficult to believe, in the absence of evidence, that the language of 
that false dawn in the reign of Alfonso III (866-910), was maintained throu-
ghout the Tenth Century when the Christian rulers of the north lived in the 
shadow of the magnificent caliphate of Córdoba and during that long period 
until and, nearly everywhere, beyond the mid-Eleventh Century, when there 
was no opportunity for Christian military conquest. It is difficult not in large 
measure to concur with those who far more fruitfully interpret the Reconquista 
in a dif ferent light and more valuably stress the economic, political and social 
developments of Hispanic society; who do not see God or religion or ideas 
motivating any advances that were made but rather a series of raids and skir-
mishes fought for temporal prizes and most of ten fought by Christian 
kingdoms that were very much individual and opposed to one another; who 
point to the Cid, a mercenary who fights for his daily bread and for either side. 
Christian and Muslim, and concur with Fletcher that 'the evidence —or lack of 
it— suggests that Spaniards of the eleventh and early twelfth century were not 
interested in a programme of Reconquest'3^. 
34 For v i e w s of the Reconquista, J. N. HiLLGARTH, «Spanish h is tor iography and Iber ian real i ty»: 
History and Theory 24 (1985) 23-43; J. A. MARAVALL, El Concepto de España en la Edad Media, 
Madrid 1964, 294; R. MÉNENDEZ PlDAL, El imperio hispánico y los cinco reinos, Madrid 1950, 205; 
IDEM, La España del Cid, Buenos Aires 1939, 30, 51, 162; D. LOMAX, La Reconquista, Barcelona 
1984, 9-13; C. SANCHEZ-ALBORNOZ, Spain: A Historical Enigma, 2 vols, Madrid 1975, 1, 21; J. 
VlCENS VIVES, Approaches to the History of Spain, University of CaUfomia 1970, 46; J. MARÍAS, 
Understanding Spain, University of Michigan 1990, 89; J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, Invertebrate Spain, 
London 1937, 43. 
35 R. FLETCHER. «Reconquest and Crusade in Spain c. 1050-1150»: Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 37 (1987) 34; IDEM, The Quest for El Cid, London 1989, 4; R. COLLINS, Early 
Medieval Spain: Unity in Diversity, 400^1000, London 1983, 235; B. WHEELER, «The Reconquest of 
Spain before 1095»: K. SETTON (Ed.), A History of the Crusades (cit.n. 30), 1, 31-9; R. DoZY, Re-
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6. RECONQUISTA AND CRVSADE 
Hesitancy during the last decades of the Eleventh Century, and then em-
phatically in the first two decades of the Twelfth, what we call the Reconquis-
ta, however deformed it may then have been, was transformad by the Papacy 
into a matter for all Christianity, converted into what we call a Crusade. The 
Spanish crusade, preached as a battle for the inheritance of Christ, was affor-
ded much of the same crusading terminology as the battle for the Holy Land, 
elevated with many of the privileges and advantages of the spiritual and tem-
poral order conceded to the Eastern crusaders, and compared to though note-
quated with it by successive popes and councils^^. It was increased in value by 
the insistence of Urban II and Paschal II conscious of the threat from Ben Yu-
suf, that the Spanish were not to go crusading to Jerusalem (an insistence con-
sistently ignored and then dropped)^^; in the protection of those military orders 
that came from outside of the Peninsula, tbe Templars and the Hospitallers, 
who played such a significant role in the Aragonese reconquest in particular, 
cherches sur l'histoire et la littérature de l'Espagne pendant le Moyen Age, 2 vols, Leiden 1860, 2, 
233; J. Ruiz DOMÉNEC, «El significado histórico de la batalla de Las Navas de-Tolosa y sus conse-
cuencias»: M. A. LADERO QUESADA (Ed.), Historia General de España y America, 4, 586-90; A. 
BARBERO, La formación del feudalismo en la Península ibérica, Barcelona 1978; A. BARBERO and 
M. VIGIL, Sobre los Origines sociales de la Reconquista, Barcelona 1974; S. D E M O X Ó , Repoblación 
y sociedad en la España Cristiana medieval, Madrid 1979; J. -L. MARTIN, Evolución económica de la 
península ibérica (siglos VI-XIII), Barcelona 1976; L. NELSON, «Internal Migration in Early Aragon: 
The Settlers from Ena and Baón»: Traditio 40 (1984) 131; E. LOURIE, «A Society organizad for War: 
Medieval Spain»: Past and Present 35 (1966) 68. 
36 J. B R U N D A G E , Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader, University of Wisconsin 1969, 25 n. 
9 1 ; M . B U L L , Knightly Piety and the La y Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, 
c. 970^c, 1130, 'Oxford 1993, 12, 108; DDEM, «The Roots of Lay Enthusiasm for the First Crusade»: 
History 78 (1993) 354; H. E. J. COWDREY, «The Genesis of the Crusade: The Springs of Western 
Ideas of Holy War»: T. P. MURPHY (Ed. ) , The Holy War, Ohio State University 1976, 25 ; IDEM, 
«Pope Gregory V I F s 'Crusading p lans ' of 1074»: B . Z. K E D A R , H . E . M A Y E R , R . C . S M A I L (Eds), 
Ourremer, Jerusalem 1982, 40 ; A. F E R R E I R O , «The siege of Barbastro, 1064-5: a reassessment»: 
Journal of Medieval History, 9 (1983)129-44; FLETCHER, The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León (cit. 
n. 4), 217; IDEM, «Reconquest and Crusade», 4 2 3 ; IDEM, Saint James's Catapult: The Life and 
Times of Diego Gelmirez of Santiago de Compostela, Oxford 1984, 297-8; P. FRANCISCO QUECEDO, 
«Influencia diplomática y económica de España en Tierra Santa»: Híspanla 9 (1949) 4; A. GARCÍA Y 
GARCÍA, «Reforma Gregoriana e idea de la 'Militia Sancti Petri' en los reinos Ibéricos»: Studi Grego-
riani 13 (1989) 260-2; IDEM, «El Concilio IV Lateranense (1215) y Francia»(cit. n. 8), 74, J. 
GILCHRIST, «The Erdmann thesis and the canon-law, 1083-1141»: P. EDBURY (Ed.), Crusade and 
Settlement, Cardiff 1985, 37-45; G0ÑI GAZTAMBIDE, Historia de la bula, 53-80; J. RILEY-SMITH, What 
were the Crusades?, London 1977, 16'-7; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz IIT unddie KreuzzUge, 176. 
37 G0Ñ1 G A Z T A M B I D E , Historia de la Bula, 60 , 64-5 ; M. J. GUDIOL, «De peregrins i peregri-
natges religiosos Catalans» : Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia 3 (1927) 93~119; A. U B I E T O A R T E T A , 
«La participación navarro-aragonesa en la pr imera cruzada»: Príncipe de Viana 8 (1947), 357-83; 
ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz HT und die KreuzzUge, 176. 
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and in the encouragement of the new foundation of Iberian confraternities 
andmilitary orders, some like the militia of Zaragoza or the order of Mountjoy, 
ephemeral, but others —Calatrava, Alcantara, Santiago— extraordinary in 
their history and holding to an administrativa unity and purpose that transcen-
ded regnal politics^^; in the protection of monasticism, particularly the Cister-
cians and the Premonstratensians, whose role in the repopulation of the fron-
tier region should not be underestimated, and whose administrativa and orga-
nisational skills allowed them to exploit the no-man's land, businessmen to 
defeat the Moors, the true heroes of the wild frontier;^^ in the legates sent to 
the peninsular figures of the first rank, -for instances. Cardinal Hugh Candidus 
(perhaps not an auspicious start), but Cardinal Rainier in 1090, who became 
Paschal II in 1099, Cardinal Boso, who had two legations and also participated 
in the Balearic venture of 1115; or Nicholas Breakespeare who in 1149 
38 A. J. FOREY, The Templars in the Corona de Aragón, Oxford 1973, 159-80; I D E M , «The Mi -
litary Orders and the Spanish Reconques t» (cit. n. 22) , 210; IDEM, «The Order of Mountjoy»: Spe-
culum 46 (1971) , 250-66; J. MARTÍ BONET, «Privilegios Papales del Archivo Diocesano de Barcelona 
(Celestino U SL Celestino n i , a. 1144 al 1196)11: Anthologica Annua 27 (1980) 779-820; M . L. L E -
DESMARUBIO, Templarios y Hospitalarios en el Reino de Aragón, Zaragoza 1981, 65 ; D. LOMAX, La 
Orden de Santiago 1170-1275, Madrid 1975, 79; IDEM, «The Order of Santiago and the Kings of León» 
; Hispania 18 (1958) 3-37; J. O'CALLAGHAN, «The foundation of the order of Alcántara, 1176-1218»: 
Catholic Historical Review 47 (1962) 471-86; IDEM, The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its 
affiliates, London 1975; F. R. DE UHAGÓN, «índice de los documentos de la orden miMtar de Calatrava» : 
Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 35 (1899) 67-9; E. BENITO RUANO, «Las Ordenes militares 
españoles y la idea de Cruzada»: Hispania 16 (1956) 3-15 - Generally, on the mihtary orders in Spain, 
the bibliographical essay of LOMAX, Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad 
Media, Salamanca 1976, and volume 11 (1981) of Anuario de Estudios Medievales. 
39 M . C O C H E R I L , «Espagne Cistercienne»: Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiasti-
ques 15 (1963) 944-69; I D E M , «L' implanta t ion des abbayes cisterciennes dans la péninsule ibéri-
que»: Anuario de Estudios Medievales 1 (1964) 217-87; L. MCCR'ANK, «The Cistercians of Poblet as 
landlords: protection, litigation and violence on the Medieval Catalan frontier»: Citeaux commentarii 
cistercienses 26 (1975) 263-8 ; I D E M , «The Cistercians of Medieval Poblet as Medieval fron-
t iersmen»: Estudios en Homenaje a Don Claudio Sánchez Albornoz en sus 90 años. Anejos, de Cua-
dernos de Historia de España 2 (1983)313-60; I D E M , «Monast ic inland empires and the Mediterra-
nean coastal reconquest in N e w Catalonia, 1050 -127 6 «B. F. TAGGIE, R. W . C L E M E N T , and J. E. 
C A R A W A Y (EdsJ , Spain and the Mediterranean, Thomas Jefferson University 1991, 32 ; J. -B . M A H N , 
L 'Ordre Cistercien et son gouvernement des origines au milieu du Xllle siècle (1098-1215), 119-131; 
M . B A S S A I A R M E N G O L , «Algunes consideracions sobre els segells Cistercenes de la pr imera época»: 
Col-loqui d'Historia del Monaquisme Cátala 1 (1966) 2 1 - ^ 1 ; C. HiGOUNET, «Un mapa de las rela-
ciones monást icas transpirenaicas»: Pirineos 1 (1951) 543-53; N . B A C K M U N D , Monasticon Prae-
monstratense, 3 vols, Straubing 1956, 154-208; I D E M , «La Orden Premonstratense en España « : 
Hispania Sacra 35 (1983) 57-85 ; T. MORAL, «Los Premonstratenses en España: Guión para un estu-
dio histórico-crít ico de la orden»: Hispania Sacra 21 (1968) 57-85; E. CORREDERA GUTIÉRREZ, «Los 
Condes soberanos de Urgel y los Premonstratenses»: Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia 36 (1963) 33-102, 
209-82. 
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witnessed the labour and sweat of Ramon Berenguer IV in the capture of Tor-
tosa and Lleida, and who in 1154 became Hadrian TV^^. 
It was through legates in combination with the Iberian church, when it was 
wilHng and able, that the Papacy sought to bring about peace between the 
Christian kingdoms by emphasising what Spaniards knew but needed remin-
ding of, that it was disharmony, the sin of division, that led to defeat. Herein 
lay the great contradiction and beauty of the papal argument in Spain - the 
papacy appealed to a higher sense of unity, a defence of the Regnum Hispanie 
(at a time when Hispanic chanceries were recognising the reality of the five 
kingdoms) and, beyond this, of the Christian Faith, and at the same time insis-
ted on fragmentation, on protecting the rights of each individual ruler within 
his realm against the dominion of a greater kingdom (usually Castile) and it 
was this idea of a higher sense of unity in operation over an accepted frag-
mentation, that was the most successful articulation given to what Maravall 
called the unitary conception of the kingdom of Spain with the system of a 
pluraüty of kings^^. 
7. THE PAPACY AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE RECONQUISTA 
This is not to say that somehow the political and economic interests of the 
participants ceased to be the signif leant f actors in the development of the 
Peninsula: of course, they did not and they never would"^ .^ On the whole kings, 
and bishops (who were shaped in the kings' likeness), paid little attention to 
the mandates of legates and popes"^ ;^ nor is it to forget that there were other 
0^ Much work remains to be done on papal legates in the Peninsula. See G. SÁBEKOW, Die pap-
stlichen Legationen nach Spanien und Portugal bis zum Ausgang des XIL Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1930; 
more generally, H. ZiMMERMANN, Die papstlichen Legaten in der ersten Halfte des 13. Jahrhunderts, 
Paderbom 1913; P. BLET, Histoire de la Représentation Diplomatique du Saint Siège des origines á 
1 'aube du XlKe siècle, Rome 1982. 
"^^ MARAVALL, El Concepto de España (cit. n. 34), 357'-8; A. OLIVER, «'Regnum Hispaniae' en 
el programa de reforma de Gregorio VII»: Studi Gregoriani 14 (1991) 76-7; LiNEHAN, «Religion, 
nationalism and national identity»(cit. n. 17), 176. 
42 J. MÍNGUEZ, La Reconquista, Madrid 1989, 8. 
43 s . B A R T O N , «The Count, the Bishop and the Abbot: Armengol VI of Urgel and the Abbey of 
Valladolid»: English Historical Review 111 (1996) 99-100; R. FLETCHER, «Regalian Right in Twelfth 
Century Spain: the case of Archbishop Martin of Santiago de Compostela»: Journal of Ecclesiastical 
History 28 (1977) 359; IDEM, Saint James's Catapult (cit. n. 36), 210; P. LiNEHAN, «The Synod of 
Segovia»: Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 10 (1980) 39; D . LOMAX, «Don Ramón, bishop of Falen-
cia (1148-1184)»: Homenage a Jaime Vicens Vives, Barcelona 1965, 1, 288 ; B . REILLY, «On getting 
to be a bishop in Leon-Casti le: The 'Emperor ' Alfonso V E and the Post-Gregorian Church»: Studies 
in Medieval and Renaissance History 1 (1978) 67-8 . 
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extemas forces, particularly increased contacts across the Pyrenees and, above 
all, the zealotry of the Almoravid rulers, that shaped developments"^ "^ . It is 
however to say that the royal ideology of the Reconquista, previously poorly 
formulated, from the late Eleventh Century, while holding to its patriotic ori-
gins, is very much to be understood as a papal imposition of those notions, as 
they have been called theological, feudal, even apocalyptic'"^^, which were 
adopted for the Crusades, on to societies that were ripe for the reception of 
such formulae. The language of the Reconquista is the language of the Refor-
med Papacy and is more fully expressed in the letters of popes, particularly 
from Gregory VII to Paschal II, than in any other sources: Tota Hispania' , 
'recuperare' , 'restituere', liberare', 'reparare', 'reddere, 'revocare', irestaura-
re', 'perderé'- the papal letters are packed with the words of the Reconquista"^^. 
It is this language, likewse adopted by Cluny^^, that gradually develops in the 
Peninsula. We see the Iberian formualation of the idea of the Reconquista gi-
ven verve by the reformers in' 1076 in Sancho Ramirez's desire to expand the 
Church of Christ, to recover it and to liberate it from the enemies of the Crucif 
ied"^ ,^ or with Alfonso VI in 1086 speaking of 'land stolen from the Church and 
'restoring the Faith'4^, but far more expressively formulated by Ramon Beren-
guer IV in a grant of 1143 to the Templars 'for the crushing, conquest and 
expulsion of the Moors, for the exaltation of the Faith and religion of Sacred 
Christianity ... for the exercise of the office of a military order in the region of 
Spain against the Saracens, for the remission of my sins, for the honour of 
God, who honours those honouring Him, and for the salvation of the soul of 
my father^o. This is to say, prior to the second crusade, not only reUgious but 
44 BiSHKO, «The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest « (cit. n. 30), 3989; D E F O U R N E A U X , Les 
Frangais en Espagne (cit. n. 17), 126-193; cf. BULL, Knightly Piety (cit. n. 36), 72; L. NELSON, 
«Rotrou of Perche and the Aragonese Reconquest»: Traditio 26 (1970) 114; D. LOMAX, «Catalans in 
the Leonese Empire»: Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 59 (1982) 191. 
45 G I L C H R I S T , «The Erdmann Thesis» (cit. n. 36), 4 1 ; IDEM, «The Papacy and the War against 
the 'Saracens ' , 795-1217»: International History Review 10 (1988) 190. 
46 Especially, MDHI, nos. 13, p . 24; 24, p . 40; 27, p . 4 3 ; 29, p . 46 ; 32, p . 50; 42 , p . 6 1 ; 45 , p . 65 ; 
47 , p . 67; 59, p . 76; 62, p . 79; 63 , p . 80; 72, p . 89; 76, p . 92; 80, p . 97; M A R A V A L L , El Concepto de 
España, 287. 
47 H. E. J. COWDREY, «Cluny and the First Crusade»: Revue Bénédictine 83 (1973), 285-311; 
IDEM, The Cluniacsandthe Gregorian Reform, Oxford 1970, 219, 227, 246-7; BiSHKO, «The Spanish 
and Portuguese Reconquest». 399,- FLETCHER. The Quest for El Cid (cit. n. 35), 145-6. 
48 Documentos correspondientes al reinado de Sancho Ramírez, ed. J. S A L A R R U L L A N A DE DiOS 
and E. IBARRA Y RODRIGUEZ, 2 vols, Zaragoza 1907-13, 1, no. 48 , p . 188. 
49 Cited F L E T C H E R , «Reconquest and Crusade in Spain» (cit. n. 35), 39. 
50 Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón, ed. P. DE 
BOFARULL Y M A S C A R Ó , 42 vols, Barcelona 1847-1973, no.63, pp. 93-9; G. CONSTABLE, «The Se-
cond Crusade as seen by contemporaries»: Traditio 9 (1953) 232; cf. C. T Y E R M A N , «Were there any 
crusades in the Twelfth Century?»: English Historical Review 110 (1995)561-2. 
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seculars of the greatest inf luence sanctioned the Reconquista as something far 
above temporal aspirations. 
8. CELESTINE III AND THE RECONQUISTA 
Yet further setbacks accompanied renewed optimism. After the death of Al-
fonso VII (1126-1157) and the break-up of the Leonese-Castilian empire, this 
decimation of Spanish unity produced a further period of unsettled rela-
tionships between the Spanish kings. Effectively the wars among the Five 
kingdoms were almost continua in the last third of the Twelfth Century, and at 
least seventeen treaties in the half century after 1157 would not lead one to 
argue for a superabundance of love between the Christian kings^^ It was Ce-
lestine III, for half a century papal expert on Hispanic affairs, and twice legate 
in the Peninsula, who forcefully urged internar pacification^^. Zerbi has eluci-
dated Celestinels role: It was primarily Celestine who insisted on the 1'reges 
Hispaniarum' as a body inside the spiritual Christian unity, and demanded 
from them an alliance and co-operation. In virtue of his office of pastor of the 
universal church, Celestine consideres it his duty to eliminate all discord and 
to guarantee tranquility, particularly at a moment, after the battle of Hattin (4 
iuly 1187), when all energies ought to be put into defeating the Saracens. To 
fight the evil in Iberia, Celestine required a community of kingdoms that res-
pected the laws of God and the laws of the Church and that, united in peace, 
conducted in solidarity the battle for the defence of Christianity^^. 
51 MANSILLA, «Inocencio III y los reinos hispanos» (cit. n. 4), 13; MÉNENDEZ PlDAL, El Imperio 
Hispánico (cit. n. 34) F 180; LOMAX, La Reconquista (cit. n. 34), 147-161; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII 
(cit. n. 4), passim; BiSHKO, «The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest «(cit. n. 30), 412-417. 
52 p . Z E R B I , Papato, Impero, e 'Respublica Christiana' dal II87- 1198, Milan 1955, 47 ; F. FlTA, 
«Primera legación del Cardenal Jacinto en España. Bulas inéditas de Anastasio IV: Nuevas luces 
sobre el concilio nacional de Valladolid y otros datos inéditos»: Boletín de la Real Academia de la 
Historia 14 (1889) 530-55; IDEM, «Catorce bulas de la catedral de Pamplona, que faltan a la colec-
ción de Loewenfeld, desde el año 1096 hasta el de 1196 -observaciones críticas sobre un concilio de 
Calahorra que presidió el cardenal Jacinto en 1155»: Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 14 
(1889) 495-509; Alfonso II, Rey de Aragón, Conde de Barcelona y Marqués de Provenía: Documen-
tos (1162-96), ed. A. I. SÁNCHEZ CASABÓN, Zaragoza 1995, no. 161, p. 237; G. GONZALVO I Bou, 
Les Constitucions de Pau i treva de Catalunya (segles XI-XIII), Barcelona 1994, no. 12, pp. 53-60, no. 
13, pp. 61-67; Burchardo et Cuonradi Urspergensium Chronicon, MGH. ss. 23, 378-9 reports a third 
legation to Spain being unexpectedly abandoned because Cardinal Giacinto was elected Pope. On this, 
J. E. SAYERS, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III (1216-1227), 
Cambridge 1984, 10-1. 
53 Z E R B I , Papato, 148-159; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz IIP und die Kreuzzüge (cit. n. 31), 179-
8 1 ; GOÑI G A Z T A M B I D E , Historia de la Bula (cit. n. 22), 9 6 - 9 ; FOREY, «The Military Orders and the 
Spanish Reconquest» (cit. n. 22), 220; FLETCHER, The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León (cit. n. 4) , 
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Celestine's plans came close to success. Through a series of councils, lega-
tions and bulls, he secured truces between the waning Christian factions, 
threatened with excommunication those kings who sided with the Moor 
against Christian powers, bolstered the prestige of Portugal and Navarre in 
particular against Castillan hegemony, encouraged the military orders in Spain 
to continue the struggle with the infidel despite the truces which existed 
between Christian and Moorish rulers, and was generous in his grants of the 
remission of sin for all those who fought against the Moors out of devotion^" .^ 
But near was not enough. Celestine could not overcome the festering distrust 
between Castile and León and not victory but the battle of Alarcos in 1195, 
humiliation and a total disintegration into Christian civil war faced the ageing 
pontifP^. While Alfonso II (1162-1196) of Aragon responded to Celestine's 
renewed pleas with a pilgrimage for unity to Compostela^^, the Pope was left 
with a series of uneasy truces between the Christian kings, the knowledge that 
Navarre and León would rather side with the Moor than Castile, the knowle-
dge that Castile and Aragon were intent on carving up Navarre, and that peace 
in Christian Hispania ultimately rested upon the incestuous marriage of Alfon-
so IX and Berenguela, that had been agreed in order to close the Leonese-
Castilian war of 119757. 
9. INNOCENT III AND THE RECONQUISTA 
Innocent held the crusades as his primary occupation. A man of the very 
highest intellectual calibre, possessed of an indomitable will and a rare clarity 
of vision, without ever bearing arms the most passionate of the Crusaders, for 
218, points to increased papal activity in Spain after Hattin; on this also RIVERA, La Iglesia de Toledo 
(cit. n. 4) , 219-37 . 
^^ Papsturkunden in Spanien, 2: Navarra und Aragon, ed. P. K E H R , Berlin 1928, nos. 200 -1 , pp . 
504-7, nos. 2 2 9 - 3 0 , 588-93; Papsturkunden in Portugal, ed. C. E R D M A N N , Berlin 1927, nos. 127158, 
pp. 348-79; Re gesta pontificum romanorum, ed. P. JAFFÉ, rev. S. LOEWENFELD [hereafter JLI, Leip-
zig 1885, 17265; RIVERA, La Iglesia de Toledo, no. 79, p . 228 ; F . FiTA, «El Conci l io de Lérida en 
1193 y S. Mar ia la Real de Nájera: bulas inéditas de Celest ino III, Inocencio III y Honor io III»: Bole-
tín de la Real Academia de la Historia 26 (1895)332-83. 
55 HUICI M I R A N D A , Las Grandes Batallas (cit. n. 9) , 184-210; LOMAX, La Reconquista (cit. n. 
34), 154-160; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso Di ( cit. n. 4) , 1, 72'^3; IDEM, Alfonso VIII (cit. n. 4) , 1, 383 . 
56 A. U B I E T O A R T E T A , «La peregrinación de Alfonso II de Aragán a Santiago de Composte la»: 
Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón 5 (1952) 438 ' -52 . 
57 DRH, Bk. V n , chs. 30-2 , 253-5 ; LUCAS OF TÚY, Crónica de España (cit. n. 9), 408 -11 ; G. 
CiROT (Ed.) , «Chronique latine» (cit. n. 9)263-66; Los Anales Toledanos (cit. n. 9) , 161 ; Primera 
Crónica General (cit. n. 9) , c. 1003, pp . 681-2; The Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña (cit. n. 9), 58 ; 
ZERBI, Papato, 156-70; GONZALEZ, Alfonso VIII, 1, 383-4: I D E M , Alfonso IX. 1, 83-100. 
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him the defence of Christianity was the vital aim. He was deeply convinced 
that the loss of Christian lands, in Spain and in the East, was the product of the 
Christian's sinful nature and their fondness for petty internecine warfare. In his 
famous encycUcal of 1198 for the Fourth Crusade, post miserable a plea for a 
renewed Christian world united in peace to achieve victory over the MusUm 
usurpers. Innocent showed his particular consciousness of this problem in Spain, 
of the disaster of Alarcos, and the importance of the Hispanic crusade in the 
spiritual unity that would bring about victory in the Holy Land: 'Where is your 
God to rescue you from our hands?' Innocent has the Muslims cry at the Chris-
tians. 'We have desecrated your Holy places and hold them in our hands after 
we have taken them by storm. We have broken the lances of the Gauls, brushed 
aside the assaults of the EngUsh, cut to pieces the forces of the Germans, and 
now tamed the Spaniards for a second time. Where is your God?^ ,^ 
Innocent in Spain gave himself the same objectives as Celestine- peace and 
unity. How was this to be achieved? Essentially by using the resources and 
building on the strategy that the Papacy had developed over a century and a half. 
Firstly, peace and unity could only come through a society free ft'om sin - only a 
society free from sin could be properly organizad for war. Thus, for instance, 
the incestuous marriage of Alfonso and Berenguela, for the Hispanic rulers a 
logical dynastic strategy, was for Innocent a breach of Divine law and hence a 
means to defeat. The Christian people were scandalized, wrote Innocent to 
Archbishop Peter of Compostela, that now the sins that had led to such disas-
ters and persecutions in the East were being transferred to the West^^. Thus in 
sending his legate, the saintly and erudite Cistercian Rainier of Ponza (an old 
friend of Joachim of Fiore and later Innocent's confessor) to break the marria-
ge. Innocent was from his point of view, furthering the Reconquista: 'We have 
sent you to the kingdoms of Spain to secure peace between the rulers and 
dissolve iniquitous unions'^^. 
58 Die Register Innocenz' III, I Pontifikatsjahr, Ed. 0. H A G E N E D E R and A. H A I D A C H E R , Graz-
Koln 1964, no. 336, p . 550; Potthast, 347; MPL, 214, 309; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz'III und die 
Kreuzzüge, 173-4; J. RuPP, L'Idée de Chrétienté dans la pensée pontificale des origines à Innocent 
III, Paris 1939, 96-123; P. ROUSSET, «La notion de Chrétienté aux Xle et X E e Siècles»: Le Moyen 
Age 69 (1963) 1 9 1 - 2 0 3 ; P. COLE, The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 10-95^1270, 
Cambridge Masssachusetts 1991, 80 -1 . 
59 Die Register Innocenz' III 2 Pontifikatsjahr, ed. 0. HAGENEDER, W. M A L E C Z E K and A. A. 
S T R N A D , Rome 1979, no. 72, p . 128; MDHI, no . 196, p . 210; Potthast, 716; MPL 214, 610; Linehan, 
History and the Historians (cit. n 1 . 2), 166,- the Hispanic canonists ' ruthless treatment of Innocent ' s 
controversias crusading-marriage decretals 'Quod super h is ' and 'Ex Mul ta ' may well relate to re-
sentment over the Pope ' s actions in the Peninsula. See J. B R U N D A G E , «The Crusader 's wife: A cano-
nistic quandary»: Studia Gratiana 12 (1970) 427-41 . 
60 Die Register Innocenz' III, 1 Ponifikatsjahr, no. 92, pp. 132-4; MDHI, no. 138, p . 168; Po-
tthast, 8 1 ; B . B O L T O N , «For the see of Simon Peter: The Cistercians at Innocent 's nearest frontier», 1-
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Secondly, peace and unity could only be achieved by maintaining the ba-
lance of power within the Peninsula through the respect for the validity of the 
younger kingdoms and, in turn, their acknowledgement of the necessity of 
papal over Castillan protection. It is what Gregory VII has in mind when he 
favours Sancho Ramírez in the 1070's^', and Alexander III in 1179 when he 
acknowledges Afonso Henriques as King of Portugal^^, and Celestine III when 
granting Sancho VII the title 'rex Navarrorum' in 1196^ .^ Innocent, rather than 
forming Spain around Castile, attempted to fortify the poHtical position of the 
different kings. For instance, this is partly why Innocent initially was so keen 
to protect Sancho VII of Navarre from the invasion of Alfonso VIII and Peter 
II in 1199, though Sancho's subsequent alliance with the Saracens rendered 
him indefensible^" ,^ and probably one reason why Peter 11 was crowned in Ro-
me in 120465. 
20 and F. ROBB, «'Who hath chosen the better part? (Luke 10, 42) ' Pope Innocent IE and Joachim of 
Fiore on the diverse forms of religious Ufe», 157-170 : J. LOADES (Ed.), Monastic Studies: the conti-
nuity of Tradition, Bangor 1991; I. RAMILA, «Inocencio III y la cruzada de Las Navas de Tolosa»: 
Revista de archivos, bibiotecas y museos 31 (1928) 455-64, stresses the unity point. 
61 GREGORY Vn, Das Register, ed. E. CASPAR, 2nd edn. 1 vol. m 2, MGH Epistolae Selectae, 4-
5, Berlin 1955, i, no. 63, pp. 91-2; MDHI, no. 9, pp. 16-7; JL, 4841; D. SMITH, «Sancho Ramírez and 
the Roman Rite»: Studies in Church History 32 (1996) 100-1; J. -M. SOTO RÁBANOS, «Introducción 
del Rito Romano en los Reinos de España. Argumentos del Papa Gregorio VII»: Studi Gregoriani 14 
(1991) 171; On Sancho's subsequent dealings with Rome, R. SOMERVILLE, Pope Urban II, The 
Collecti o Britannica, and the Council ofMelfi (1089), Oxford 1996, 97-8, 157-8. 
62 JL, 13420; M . P A C A U T , Alexandre III: Etude sur la conception du Pouvoir Pontifical dans sa 
pensée et dans son oeuvre, Paris 1956, 221-2; C. ERDMANN, Das Papsttum und Portugal im ersten 
Jahrhundert der portugiesishcen Geschichte, Berlin 1928, 29-32, 49-50; J. FRIED, Der papstliche 
Schutz fur LaienfUrsten. Die politische Geschichte des papstlichen Schutzprivilegs fur Laien, Heidel-
berg 1980, 72 -3 ; m y A. GARCÍA Y GARCIA, «Alejandro los Reinos Ibéricos»: Miscelánea Rolando 
Bandinelli Papa Alessandro III, Siena 1986, 244. 
63 Papsturkunden in Spanien 2 (cit. n. 54), no. 230, 591-3 ; P. K E H R , «El Papado y los reinos de 
Navarra y Aragón hasta mediados del siglo XII «Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón, 2 
(1946) 167-8; ZERBI, Papato, 158-60; J .~M. L A C A R R A , Historia del Reino de Navarra en la Edad 
Media, Pamplona 1975, 228. 
64 MDHI, no . 181, pp . 1 9 7 - 8 ; Potthast, 597; MPL, 214, 509; DRH, Bk VIL chs. 30-2, pp. 252-4; 
G. ClROT (Ed), «Chronique Lat ine», 265-6; LUCAS OF TÚY, Crónica de España, 408; Anales Toleda-
nos, 165; C. S M I T H , Christians and Moors in Spain, 3 vols, Warminster 1988-90, 2, 6-11; Colección 
Diplomática de Santa María de Roncesvalles (77271300), ed. M . I. OSTOLAZA, Pamplona 1978, no . 
22, pp. 106-8; ZERBI, Papato, 157 -60 ; L A C A R R A , Historia del reino de Navarra, 228-9; GON-
ZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, 1, 486; GONZALEZ, «Reclamaciones de Alfonso V n i a Sancho el Fuerte y trata-
do del reparto de Navarra en 1198»: Híspanla 3 (1943) 545-68; A. UBIETO A R T E T A , «Nava-
rra ' -Aragón y la idea imperial de Alfonso V i l de Castilla»: Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona 
de Aragón, 6 (I956)4l-S2. 
65 MDHI, no . 307, pp . 339 -41 ; Potthast, 2322, 2 3 6 1 ; MPL, 215, 550; FRIED, Papstliche Schutz, 
208; P A L A C I O S , La Coronación (cít.n. 3), 167; SMITH, Innocent III and Aragon-Catalonia (cit. n. 3), 
36-94. 
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Thirdly, peace and unity were to be achieved necessarily through the re-
form of the Iberian church. The reform of the Church was the essential prere-
quisite for the defeat of the Moor - the protection of the Church from the inter-
ference of the lay power and the support of the tradicional and newer mihtary 
orders was vital here; as was Roman interference in the internar disputes of the 
Church, such as that highlighted by the anonymous author of the Gesta Inno-
centa between Braga and Compostela, a result, like most of these disputes of 
trying to adapt preconquest structures to Reconquest situations, where Inno-
cent successfully juggled with the problem of Compostela holding metropoli-
tan rights over half the sees of Portugal and Braga rights over half the sees of 
Leon^ ,^ or the notorious dispute between Huesca and Lleida in the East of the 
Peninsula, which had been going on long before either city had been recaptu-
red from the Moors, and where Innocent imposed a solution that was so admi-
rable judicious that undoubtedly neither party was able to question papal justi-
ce or, indeed, decide whether it had eventually won the game^ .^ These disputes 
drained both the spiritual and physical energies of the land, and this is why 
Innocent was so impatient to put an end to them. 
The reform of the Church, the establishment of peace, the spiritual purifi-
cation of Christendom - these were the essential elements in the promotion of 
the Hispanic Crusade. 
10. INNOCENT III AND THE LAS NAVAS CAMPAIGN 
It was with these objectives firmly in mind that Innocent acted in the Las 
Navas campaign. The exact circumstances of the initiation of the Crusade are 
66 Gesta Innocenta, c. 42 , MPL, 214, 81-2; D. M A N S I L L A , «Disputas diocesanos entre Toledo, 
Braga y Compostela en los siglos XII al XV»: Anthologica Annua 3 (1955) 114-29; IDEM, «Origines 
de la organización metropolitana en la iglesia española»: Hispania Sacra 12 (1959)255-91; IDEM, 
«Formación de la provincia Bracarense después de la invasión árabe»: Hispania Sacra 1 4 ( 1 9 6 1 ) 5-
25. At the height of the Las Navas campaign, Innocent would be dealing with a dispute on diocesan 
limits between Toledo and Avila (Documentación Medieval de la Catedral de Avila, éd. A. BARRIOS 
G A R C I A , Salamanca 1981, no. 48 , p . 43 (13/05/1212». Border disputes between Burgos and Osma 
would bother Innocent almost to his dying day (Documentación de la Catedral de Burgos (1184-
1222), éd. J. M. GARRIDO GARRIDO, Burgos 1983, no. 480, pp. 294-5, no. 4 9 1 , pp. 307-9). 
67 MDHI, no. 2 7 1 , pp. 292-300; Potthast, 1925; MPL, 215 , 70; E. GROS BÍTRIA, Los límites dio-
cesanos en el Aragón Oriental, Zaragoza 1980; F. B A L A G U E R , « L O S límites del obispado de Aragón y 
el concilio de Jaca de 1063»: Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón 4 (1951) 69-138; F . 
A R R O Y O I L E R A , «El dominio territorial del obispado de Roda (siglos XI y XII)»: Hispania Sacra 22 
(1969) 69-128; A. DURAN GUDIOL, «La Santa Sede y los obispados de Huesca y Roda en la primera 
mitad del siglo XII»: Anthologica Annua 13 (1965)35-134; A. U B I E T O A R T E T A «Disputas entre los 
obispados de Huesca y Lérida en el siglo XI I»:Estudios de la Edad Media en la Corona de Aragón 2 
(1946) 187-240. 
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not altogether clear. While Muslim raids along the Catalan coast may well 
have led to Peter U of Aragon's call to Innocent for support, it is probable that 
it was a war both Peter and the Castillan king wished to start^ .^ But what is 
clear is that, on 16 February 1210, Innocent responded to Peter H's crusading 
enthusiasm with Exemplo Miserabilis to Archbishop Rodrigo and his suffra-
gans. From the outset of the campaign we find evident Innocent's view of 
victory in Spain as essential for success in the Holy Land and his immense 
caution after so many crusading disasters, as well as the persuasiva powersof a 
mature politician. As the Christian people have suffered a loss in the Holy 
Land of Christ, wrote Innocent ( ever mindful of Hattin ), now you must stand 
against the trickery of the pagans, at the time when it is fitting and expediente 
not allowing our Holy Land also to be profaned with the filth of their pollution. 
Since King Peter, ortodoxa fidei zelo succensus, was prepared to fight, the ar-
chbishop is to persuade Alfonso to emulate this pious proposal pro Christi no-
mine and undertake this task with similar devotion at the opportune time. If Al-
fonso would not go himself he should at least not impede his subjects who 
would receive a full remission of sins in promoting tantum Dei servitium^^. 
No doubt Rodrigo did not address Alfonso VIII, the humiliated of Alarcos, 
in quite that goading manner, but the involvement of Castile was secure, and 
having received indication of the young Prince Ferdinand's desire to dedicate 
the first fruits of his military Hfe to Almighty God, in Significavit nobis o/10 
December 1210 to the archbishops and bishops of Spain, Innocent sought the 
unity or neutrahty of the other kings and their subjects, who were not strictly 
tied by truces to the Saracens, to aid the first-bom son of Castile in extermina-
ting the enemies of the name of Christ from the borders of His inheritance 
which they impiously occupied, for which work the Christian rulers would 
receive a full remission of sins and merit the glory of heaven, as would those 
who proceeded out of devotion from whatever country^o. 
While in Cum personam tuam of 22 February 1211, Innocent rejected Al-
fonso's 'request for a legate to Spain because of the restlessness of the times 
(témpora impacata), and also probably given Alfonso's much criticised pre-
vious crusading track-record the Pope was doubtful of the success of the en-
terprise, nevertheless he promised he would satisfy the King's request at a 
68 Above n. 20 and J. VENTURA, Pere el Católici Simó de Montfort, Barcelona 1960, 138. 
69 j^Dfjj no. 416, p. 436; M. MACCARRONE, «Orvieto e la Predicazione della Crociata»: in his 
Studi su Innocenzo III, Padua 1972, 94. 
70 MDHI, no . 442, pp. 472-3 ; Potthast, 4142; MPL, 216, 353; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes 
Batallas, 228; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz IIP und die KreuzzUge, 181. Perhaps the letter was carried 
from Rome by a Trinitarian as they received a privilege confirming their spiralling fortunes at Burgos 
on 18/12/1210 (Documentación del Monasterio de la Trinidad de Burgos (1198-1400), éd. L. GARCIA 
ARAGÓN, Burgos 1985, no. 9, pp. 17-8). 
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more opportune time and reassured that if any king of Spain who had a peace 
with the King of Castile presumed to violate it while Alfonso was on cam-
paign, he should suffer the ecclesiastical punishments consequent of such an 
action^ ^  Moreover, in Cum donationes of 12 April 1211, recognizing the ever 
present financiar troubles of the King of Aragon. Innocent revoked many do-
nations that Peter had made before he reached his majority, since he conside-
red it fitting to do so when considering the seriousness and expense with which 
Peter undertook the battle with the enemies of the Christian name, providing, 
of course, that Peter did not revoke donations he had made to the Church wi-
thout an ecclesiastical judgement on the matter^^ 
In Quoad peticiones of 1 June 1211, Innocent forestalled Rodrigo's attempt 
to tie the primacy issue into the crusade. Rodrigo had hoped to gain a further 
confirmation of his privileges by using his most definitely important part in the 
organization and preaching of the -crusade to reconfirm the status of his see. In 
return Innocent accused the archbishop of a terrible lack of foresight; with the 
invasion of the Saracens now grave danger threatened Spain and this was har-
dly a fitting time to sustain a scandal in Spain concerning the primacy. Cum 
accepero tempus, ego iustitiam iudicabo, quoted Innocent from Psalm 74, 
stealing the moral highground''^. 
In Recepimus litteras dolore of 31 January 1212, Innocent internationalized 
the crusade, calling upon the bishops of France and Provence to preach it to 
their people. Letters full of sadness and fear had reached Innocent from King 
Alfonso of Castile, since the Saracens had entered into Spain in vast numbers, 
and had besieged and occupied a castle of the Cistercian order called Salvatie-
rra. Alfonso, fearing that the danger would increase if he did not act now, ca-
lled for a campaign commencing in the Octave of Pentecost next, electing to 
die rather than see harm done to the Christian people Therefore Innocent orde-
red the prelates to exhort their people, granting them a remission of sins if they 
would aid Alfonso both with men and money. By doing this both bishops and 
people would merit eternal glory '^^ . 
71 MDHl no. 447, pp. 475-6; Potthast, 4185; MPL, 216, 353; LiNEHAN, History and the Histo-
rians, 319; HUICI M I R A N D A , Las Grandes Batallas, 229; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz III. und die 
KreuzzUge, 181. 
72 MDHI, no. 453 , p . 4 8 1 ; Potthast, 4220; MPL, 216, 404; G. CiROT (Ed.), «Chronique latine», 
354; T. N. BiSSON, Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the Early Count-Kings (1151-1213), 2 vols. 
University of California 1984, 1, 130. 
73 MDHI, no. 455, pp. 482-3; Potthast, 4258; MPL, 216, 423; LiNEHAN, History and the Histo-
rians, 328 n. 49. 
74 MDHI, no. 468, pp. 497-8; Potthast, 4373; MPL, 216, 514; DRH, Bk. VI I, c. 35, p . 253; LU-
CAS O F TÚY, Crónica de España, 413; Primera Crónica General, c. 1008, p . 686; GoÑI 
G A Z T A M B I D E , Historia de la bula, 113; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 229; L. SUÁREZ 
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In Cum personam tuam of 4 February 1212, having sent his condolences to 
Alfonso for the death of Prince Ferdinand (in Madrid in October 1211), and 
having informed Alfonso that he had initiated the preaching in France, Innocent 
developed one of his main crusading themes, that the humihty of the Christian 
before God would eventually triumph over the arrogance and evil pride of the 
infidel. 'Place your hope in the Lord your God', he addresses Alfonso, 'and 
humble yourself before Him who gives grace to the humble, and returns retribu-
tion to the arrogant; it is through the power that God gives to you, that you will 
magnificently triumph over the enemies of the Cross of Christ'. Despite this, 
considering the possible effect on morale of the loss of Ferdinand, and recog-
nizing that apart from the King of Aragon, the support or even neutrality of the 
other kings was not secure, and seeing that war in the Midi, conñict in Germa-
ny, and interdict in England made outside support seem unlikely. Innocent 
offered Alfonso the option of saving face and negotiating a truce'^ .^ 
Alfonso, however, was now determined to go ahead and in Quanta nunc 
nécessitas of 5 April 1212, to Rodrigo and Archbishop Peter of Compostela, 
Innocent made one final effort to secure peace. How great a danger now 
threatened Spain was best known to them and therefore they should persuade 
the kings of Spain to serve a peace and truce, especially during the imminent 
danger of the Saracen wars. If anybody (and here Innocent specifically ment 
ions Alfonso IX of León), should help in any way the enemies of the Cross of 
the Lord, who not only aspired to the destruction of Spain but also to other lands 
of the Faithful of Christ, they were to be subject to excommunication and their 
lands placed under interdicto. Moreover, if there were quarrels between the 
kingdoms, because of the immediate danger these were to be deferred to a more 
suitable time, and the royal procurators could then argue out their differences at 
the Papal Court, and Innocent would hear the cases personally'^ ^. 
Innocent's final contribution prior to the battle was the Supplicatio Gene-
ralis, the call for a general procession in Rome on 22 May 1216, the Wednes-
day after Pentecost, the time originally set for the beginning of the Las Navas 
campaign and the time at which the Pope presumed the campaign was taking 
FERNÁNDEZ, Historia de España, Madrid 1970, 268-9; L. G. DE VALDEAVELLANO, Historia de 
España: De los origines a la baja Edad Media, 2 vols, Madrid 1973, 2, 600. 
75 MDHI, no. 470, pp. 500-1; Potthast, 4375; MPL, 216, 513; DRH, Bk. VII, c. 36, pp. 257-8; G. 
CIROT (Ed.), «Chronique latine», 273; Los Anales Toledanos, 171; Primera Crónica General, c. 
1009, p. 687; 'Annales Compostellaní', ed. E. FLÓREZ and M. RISCO, España Sagrada, 51 vols, 
Madrid 1747-1879, 23, 323; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 229; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz 
III und die Kreuzzüge, 182. 
76 MDHI, no . 4 7 1 , pp . 501-2 ; Potthast, 4417; MPL, 216 , 5 5 3 ; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes 
Batallas, 229-30 ; RosCHER, Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge, 183. 
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place '^^ . Here more clearly than ever before we can witness the fusion of the 
ideology of the crusade with the movement of lay piety, with the call for vita 
apostólica, and it is here, prior to the Fifth Crusade, and also, as Dickson has 
recently written, significantly influencing the Children's crusade^^, that Inno-
cent uses those liturgical skills that he had learnt before all else, to draw the 
Christian community into a mystical union that transcended tradicional politi-
cal and ethnic considerations. 
The procession was called for the peace of the Universal Church and the 
Christian people (pro pace universales ecclesie ac populi Christiani), especia-
lly so that God might be favourable in the war that was now supposed to be 
taking place between the Christians and the Saracens in Spain, lest the Lord 
should give his people up to mockery, and allow other nations to rule over 
them. There were to be three groups in the procession, essentially men, wo-
men, and clergymen, all proceeding in prayjer with devotion and humility and 
all going barefoot, each group taking a different route, but all meeting at the 
same place, the Lateran campus. Meanwhile, Innocent, with the Cardinal 
bishops and the papal chaplains, was to enter the chapel which is called the 
Sancta Sanctorum, and from there they were to process with a relic of the True 
Cross, to the palace of the cardinal bishop of Albano, in front of which Inno-
cent was to preach a sermon to all the people. Later the Pope, clerics and la-
ymen were to return to the Lateran basilica for the celebration of Mass before 
all who were able were to return home to undertake a severe bread and water 
fast. Through prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. Innocent insisted, the com-
passion of the Creator would be returned to the Christian people^^. 
11. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LAS NAVAS TO INNOCENT III 
If, as tradition has it, the bones of the Cid rattled in their tomb on the eve of 
Las Navas^o, then we might say that the ghost of Celestine III would have 
breathed a sigh of relief on the evening of 16 July. The Christians had won, 
spectacularly, and Innocent III had been proved right. We do not know when 
he received the news, but it was by mid-October and probably well before. 
Innocent read out to the Roman people Alfonso VIIFs famous account of Las 
Navas and the taking of ubeda, and explained it to them in the vernacular. All 
77 MDHI, no. 473 , pp. 503-4; Potthast, 4417 ; MPL, 216, 553 . 
78 G. D I C K S O N . «La Genèse de la croisade des Enfants (1212)»: Bibliothèque de l'école des 
Chartres, 153 (1995)82. 
79 MDHI no. 473 , pp. 503-4; Potthast, 4417; MPL, 216, 553 . 
80 MÉNENDEZ PIDAL, La España del Cid (cit. n. 34), 4 6 3 . 
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gave thanks that God had given Alfonso the strength and virtue to restore the 
miracles of the Old Testament. Rather than being, as Roscher maintained, of 
little importante to Innocent, Innocent saw in the success of Las Navas a sure 
sign of Divine intervention in the World. God had shown His compassion 
upon Alfonso and upon the Christian people and poured out his anger on the 
races that did not know the Lord, and the kingdoms that did not know his na-
me, humbling the strength of the arrogant and giving strength to those who 
trusted in the Lord 'Dominus virtutem populo suo dabit', reflected Innocent 
reminding Alfonso that God and not he had won the battle^ ^  Innocent was 
now convinced that the heretics who poisoned the Church were about to be 
destroyed. He threatened the heretical Milanese, in a tone that was, as Webb 
put it, 'both minatory and exultant', that crusading victorias in Provence and 
Spain showed a multitude of armies could not destroy the Lord^ .^ Moreover, 
the optimism generated by the victory developed in Innocent's mind the idea 
of a total liberation of the Holy Land. In Quia malor, the call to the Fifth Cru-
sade of April 1213, in referente to Las Navas, Innocent said 'God has now 
given us this good sign that the end of the beast is approaching'^3. As Lomax 
demonstrated, Iberia now receded in its importante to Christendom^" ,^ though 
Innocent left open the option of organizing the war against the Moors if cir-
cumstances required^^. 
12. THE FRENCH AND LAS NAVAS 
One of the most significant contributions Innocent had attempted to make 
to Las Navas was in his efforts to internationalize the crusade. By Alfonso 
VIII's estimate about 62,000 and by Arnaud Amahic's about 40,000 French 
81 MDHI, no. 488, pp. 519-21; Potthast, 4613; MPL, 216, 703; MACCARRONE, «Orvieto e la 
Predicazione»(cit. n. 64). 98-99, cf. AMALRIC, De Francorum Expeditione, RHGF 19 (cit. n. 29), 253: 
'Benedictus per omnia Dominus Jesus-Christus, qui per suam misericordiam in nostris remporibus, 
sub felici apostolatu domini Papae Innocentii, de tribus pestilentium hominum et inimicorum eccle-
siae sanctae suae, videlicet orientalibus schismaticis, occidentalibus haereticis, meridionalibus Sarra-
cenis, victorias contulit Catholicis Christianis'. 
82 Potthast, 4611; MPL, 216, 710-4; D. W E B B , «The Pope and the Cities: Anticlericalism and 
Heresy in Innocent E l ' s Italy»: Studies in Church History, subsidia 9 (1991) 150. 
83 Potthast, 4 7 2 5 ; MPL, 216 . 817 : MACCARRONE. «Orvie to e la Predicazione», 100-1 . 
84 D. LOMAX, «La conquista de Andalucía a través de la historiografía europea de la época»: E. 
C A B R E R A (Ed.), Andalucía entre Oriente y Occidente (1236-1492). Actas del V Coloquio Internacio-
nal de historia medieval de Andalucía, Cordoba 1988, 3749. 
85 J. POWELL, Anatomy of a Crusade 1213-1221, Universi ty of Pennsylvania 1986, 2 1 , 31 n. 18; 
L I N E M A N , Spanish Church (cit. n. 6) , 6; GOÑI G A Z T A M B I D E , Historia de la Bula (bit. n. 22), 133. 
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soldiers came to the crusade^^. Arnaud Amalric, Lucas of Tuy, Alfonso VIH, 
the Annals of Toledo, the Primera crónica general were all agreed that these 
knights had come because of the indulgences granted by the Pope^^. Unfortu-
nately, only Arnaud Amalric and about 130 of these men took part in the 
battle^^. The exact reasons and circumstances in which the ultramontano cru-
saders departed may never be absolutely clear. Arnaud Amalric would have 
been in the best position to inform us (and everybody else since it was his 
victory letter to the Cistercian General Chapter which spread news of Las Na-
vas throughout the Occident) but regrettably, though understandably, he opted 
for an embarassed silence^^. The Spanish eagerness to paint the French knights 
as cowardly and treacherous, and thus finally to put paid to all that nonsense 
about Charlemagne and all those ghastly chansons, does not altogether help^^. 
Certainly the terrain was diffcult and it was somewhat hot, as Alfonso VIII 
wrote to Innocent, tongue in cheek^^ But that is not enough in itself. One 
might reflect that for that same July 1212; Pierre Vaux-de-Cemay describes 
how, on the road to Carcassonne with Lady de Montfort, many of his compa-
nions fainted because of the violent heat of the summer and the difficulty of 
the route - yet few would suggest the Albigensian crusaders lacked mettle^^ 
Certainly the very different actitudes of the French and the Iberian forces on 
how to behave towards the MusHms (the former opting for slaughter, tended to 
see compromise as treachery and the latter f inding negotiation with the enemy 
much easier than with their allies)^^ and the lack of provisions played a great 
86 MDHI, no . 483 , p . 510; AMALRIC, De Francorum Expeditione, 251; on the numbers in the 
battle, M. ALVIRA CABRER, «La muerte del enemigo en el pleno medievo: cifras e ideología (El 
modelo de Las Navas de Tolosa)»: Hispania 55 (1995) 403-423. 
87 A M A L R I C , De Francorum Expeditione, 250 -1 ; LUCAS OF TUY, Crónica de España, 413 ; 
M D H I , no. 483 , p . 510; Primera Crónica General, p . 692, c. 1013; Los Anales Toledanos, 111. 
88 DRH, Bk. VII, c. 6, pp . 265-6; cf. The Poem of the Cid, trans R. HAMILTON and J. PERRY, 
London 1984, 110-1, where Minaya asks for 130 knights from the Cid to attack the Moors on the 
flank. Alfonso V n i in MDHI, no. 483 , p . 511 , has 150 French knights remaining. 
89 LOMAX, «La conquista de Andalucía» (cit. n. 84), 38; M. A L V I R A C A B R E R , «El Venerable 
Ama ldo Amalar ico (h. 1196-1225): idea y realidad de un Cisterciense entre dos cruzadas»: Hispania 
Sacra 48 (1996) Sm-l. 
90 DRH, BK.IV, c i l , pp . 128-30; Los Anales Toledanos, 172; B A R K A I , Cristianos y Musulma-
nes (cit. n. 17), 217-8. 
91 MDHI, no. 483 , p . 5 1 1 ; G. CiROT (Ed. ), «Chronique latine», 356; LiNEHAN, «Religion, natio-
nalism and national identity» (cit. n. 17), 192. 
92 PIERRE DES VAUX-DE-CERNAY, Histoire Albigeoise, trans. P. GUEBIN and H. MAISSONNEUVE, 
Paris 1951, c. 339, p.l33. 
93 HUICI M I R A N D A , Las Grandes Batallas, 246; D E F O U R N E A U X , Les Français en Espagne (cit. 
n. 17), 190; R. S. LÓPEZ, «Fulfilment and Diversion in the Eight Crusades Outremer, Jerusalem 1982, 
18. B . K E D A R , H . M A Y E R , R . S M A I L (Eds), Outremer, Jerusalem 1982 ,18 . 
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part in the abandonment^ " ,^ but one should also consider that the French knights 
might have been slightly uncertain as to the purpose of the campaign, since 
Innocent and more so the Cistercian information network had preached the 
crusade very much more in terms of the loss of Salvatierra, from 1198 the 
major fortress of Calatrava, which was affiliated to Citeaux^^. We might not 
suspect this if Alfonso in his victory letter to Innocent had not been so insistent 
that the French knew that there was going to be a battle^^, and if Sancho VII, in 
the Navarrese account that reached his sister Blanche, had not maintained that 
at one point Alfonso VIII had tried to turn the Crusade upon Alfonso IX '^^ . 
That was Navarrese propaganda, and Sancho VII only arrived after the French 
departed, but it is not too unlikely that it was the sort of rumour that was al-
ready circulating in the camp. Moreover, one must consider that papal action 
in the South of France, the papal humiliation of John, and the papally inspired 
conflict in Germany, meant there were attractions above home-cooking that 
motivated their departure. 
13. THE PAPACY AND SPAIN 
The greatest success and surprise for Innocent was that Arnaud Amalric, 
whose Languedocien legation had been extended in June 1210 to include the 
diocese of Pamplona^^, managed to persuade Sancho VI I of Navarre to join 
the kings of Castile and Aragon on the battlefield, despite long-held grudges 
and a prior assurance by Sancho that he would not come^ .^ The Muslims con-
sidered that the Roman 'Emir' had threatened to turn all the Christian forces 
94 MDHI, no . 483 , p . 5 1 1 ; DRH, Bk. V E l , c. 6, pp . 265-6; Primera Crónica General, c. 1016, p . 
697; DEFOURNEAUX, Les Français en Espagne, 190; GOÑI GAZTAMBIDE, Historia de la Bula, 122; 
HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 244. 
95 LOMAX, La Reconquista (cit. n. 34), 162; FOREY, «The Military Orders and the Spanish Re-
conquest «(cit. n. 22), 212-3 ; DEFOURNEAUX, Les Frangais en Espagne, 182; J. F . O'CALLAGHAN, 
«Sobre los origines de Calatrava la nueva»: Hispania 23 (1963) 498-9 . 
96MZ)H/, no.483,p. 511. 
97 Letter of Queen Blanche to Blanche, in R H G F 19 (cit. n. 29), 255-6; cf. GOÑi GAZTAMBIDE, 
Historia de la Bula, p. 124. 
98 Potthast 4027 ; A L V I R A CABRER, «El Venerable A m a l d o Amalarico», 572; R. FOREVILLE, Le 
Pape Innocent III et La France, Stuttgart 1992, 235-6; IDEM, «Arnaud Amalric , archevêque de 
Narbonne (1196-1225)»: Narbonne, Archéologie et histoire. Fédération historique du Languedoc 
méditerranéen et du Rousillon, Montpell ier 1973, 131-2. 
99 De Francorum Expeditione, 251; DRH, Bk. VIU, c. 6, p . 266; L A C A R R A , Historia del Reino de 
Navarra (cit. n. 63), 233; cf. CARLOS, PRINCIPE DE VlANA, Crónica de los Reyes de Navarra (cit. n. 9), 
111115; La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise, éd. E. MARTIN-CHABOT, 2 vols, Paris 1931,1, p. 18. 
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Upon Sancho if he did not break his alliance with them^^ .^ Be that as it may, 
Innocent could not achieve a perfect quintet - war between Portugal and León 
in 1212, and the all too beautiful opportunity for Alfonso IX if Castile lost, 
saw to that; but crucially neither kingdom sided with the Moor and both did 
send knights to the battle^^i j ^ the interests of the Christian Faith, the Papacy 
had helped to achieve a solidarity hitherto unknown. Though the Kings of 
León and Portugal could not make it at the time, they had arrived at the battle 
within a generation and have been there on and off ever since ^ o^ . That is im-
portante For Spain, Las Navas was to represent the profound unity of the Spa-
nish kingdoms, the essential epoch-breaking act of Spanishness, a myth of 
union, more important than the battle itself, and a myth in which the Papacy 
could necessarily play no part. But that the myth existed from the time and in 
the f orm that it did owed no little amount to Innocent III and his predecessors. 
The Cyprianic-Augustinian concern with the Unity of the Church and with 
Peter as symbol of that union, so important in Innocent's pontificate^o^, had 
been transporte into a Spanish context, and at least in this sense we might say 
that Spain was made, as much as Spain ever was to be made, by and not in 
opposition to North Africa. 
100 Colección de Crónicas Árabes (cit. n. 20) , 2, 2 7 1 ; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 
240. 
101 DRH, B K . Y i n , c. 2, p . 260 ; LUCAS OF TÚY, Crónica de España, 413-4; Primera Crónica 
General c 1011 , p . 690 ; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIH 1, 1010; I D E M , Alfonso IX, 1, 144-6. 
102 Lo^. Anales Toledanos, 172; GONZALEZ, Alfonso VIII, 1, 1056-7; LlNEHAN, History and the 
Historians, 297, notes the change though pointing out that the DRH and the Primera Crónica General 
keep Alfonso IX of León fimily absent. B. R£ILLY, The Medieval Spains, Cambridge 1993, 136, in a 
rare oversight, implicitly casts the kings of Portugal and León as 'principals among the victors'. 
103 K. FROELICH, «Saint Peter, Papal Primacy, and the Exegetical Tradition, 1150-1300»: C. 
RYAN (Ed.), The Religious Roles of the Papacy: Ideals and Realities 1150-1300, Toronto 1989, 17. 
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